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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF
'CIVIL PROCEDURE AND APPEALS
By

ROBERT

B.

YEGGE*

There were no changes of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure in 1962 except by judicial interpretation. This stability in the
rules in 1962 portended possible changes in the rules in 1963. By
order of the Supreme Court of the United States on January 21,
1963, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were changed in many
respects. Predictably, the Colorado Supreme Court may consider
revising the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure to conform to the
revised Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1963.
On numerous occasions, the Colorado Supreme Court was asked
to interpret the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure in 1962. It heard
new questions and interpreted and re-examined its findings of past
years. As one might expect, problems of civil procedure tend to find
their way into almost every case before the supreme court. Problems involving the rules of procedure were found in 57 of the approximately 242 cases decided by the court.
Since the rules have meaning only in their use, not the order in
which they are organized, the following attempt to classify the rule
interpretations of 1962, according to use, is presented.
I. THE COMPLAINT
Rule 2 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure states: "There
shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil action.' " The action
shall be commenced by filing of a complaint or by service of a summons.' The complaint shall contain " a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."'2 The court
had an opportunity to give meaning to these rules, which we so
often remember but so infrequently use.
In Bernstein v. Dun & Bradstreet,Inc.,3 the supreme court considered dismissal of a libel complaint. It said: "Colorado's Rules of
Civil Procedure are designed to dispense with ritualistic, common'4
law, forms-of-action pleadings.
After reviewing the libel complaint and finding a libel per quod,
rather than a libel per se, the court determined that special damages needed to be pleaded. The court sustained the trial court's dismissal of the libel complaint for failure to properly supply the essential allegations of special damages, after opportunity had been
afforded to do so, stating:
In view of our liberal policy under these rules of dispensing with the overly technical aspects of common-law
pleading, the trial court had the discretion to allow the
plaintiff the opportunity of supplying the essential allegation of special damages by a More Definite Statement ....
Partner, Yegge, Hall and Shulenburg, Denver;
of Denver College of Law:
1 Colo. R. Civ. P. 3(a).
2 Colo. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
3 368 P.2d 780 (Colo. 1962).
4 Id. at 782.
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The trial court merely afforded plaintiff an additional opportunity of remedying what it considered to be a fatal
defect in his complaint."
Moreover, the supreme court again recognized the liberal rules
of pleading but insisted that pleadings must continue to insist upon
the essential elements of the substantive law. Liberal rules to the
contrary notwithstanding, a pleader must still assert the elements
of the claim or his complaint will be dismissed. The complaint must
state a claim.
As already noted, one manner of commencing a civil action is
filing a complaint with the court. 6 In Martin v. District Court,7 two
complaints were filed on the same subject matter. One party contended that she "commenced" an action in the Denver District
Court by service of summons and complaint on her opponent. However, her complaint was not filed until some days later. The adverse
party filed a complaint in the District Court of Adams County prior
to the filing of the complaint in the Denver District Court suit.
Propriety of service of process out of the Denver court's suit was
challenged. Service of process in Denver having been found valid,
the Denver suit was "commenced," according to the rules, before
the Adams County suit was commenced. This being true, the court
found that the Denver District Court had exclusive jurisdiction
over the controversy and ordered suspension of any further action
in the Adams County District Court.' The alternative of service of
process being prior in time to the filing of the complaint in the
court, the "commencement" provisions of Rule 3 (a) applied and the
concurrent jurisdictions of two courts, each having received complaints, was resolved.
The alternative of "commencement of an action" by service of
summons is attended with the requirement that "a complaint must
be filed within ten days after the summons is served, or, the action
may be dismissed without prejudice and in such case the court may,
in its discretion, if it shall be of the opinion that the action was
vexatiously commenced, tax a reasonable attorney's fee as cost in
favor of the defendant, to be recovered of the plaintiff or his attorney."9 In Schwarz v. Ulmer,10 the trial court awarded defendants
$100.00 for alleged failure of plaintiff's attorney to serve a complaint on her within ten days of service of summons. The supreme
court, after reviewing the record, observed that there was "(1) no
evidence as to whether the complaint was or was not filed; (2) no
expression of the opinion by the court that the action was vexatiously commenced; (3) no evidence as to what amount would constitute a reasonable attorney's fee to be taxed as cost."'1 In reversing the award of $100.00 attorney's fee in favor of the defendant,
the court literally interpreted the provisions of Rule 3 (a) requiring
evidence of non-filing vexatiousness, and reasonability of attorney's
fee.
. Id. at 783.
3
6 Colo. R. Civ. P. (a).
7 375 P.2d 105 (Colo. 1962).
8 Colo. R. Civ. P. 3(b) provides: "The
complaint or service of3 summons."
9 Colo. R. Cir. P. (a).
10 370 P.2d 889 (Colo. 1962).
11 Id. at 896.

court shall have jurisdiction from the time of filing the
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II. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Rule 8 (a) requires a jurisdictional statement in the complaint,
should the court be of limited jurisdiction. There were no Colorado
cases challenging the authority of a court of limited jurisdiction in
1962. Nevertheless, the question of jurisdiction of the court must be
considered concurrently with the question of sufficiency of the complaint. If the court in which the complaint is filed does not have
jurisdiction, the filing of that complaint becomes meaningless.
The question of the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter
did arise in 1962, as did the question of jurisdiction over the person
of defendants.
Jurisdiction over Subject Matter.-In Triebelhorn v. Turzanski, 12 the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the hornbook principles
12 370 P.2d 757 (Colo. 1962).
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that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter can be raised at
any time and that a judgment entered in a case over which the
court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter is void. The
case involved an order of conveyance of real property which followed a final decree of divorce by more than a year. The final decree of divorce made no mention of division of property owned by
the parties nor did it reserve the matter for future consideration.
The trial court's order for conveyance of the real property was reversed and vacated. The court recited the argument of the petitioner that her former husband did not originally challenge the
order for conveyance, saying:
Such argument overlooks the rule that the defense of
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter can be raised
at any time, even for the first time in this Court, and that
a trial court which in fact lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot acquire jurisdiction even 13though the
parties expressly or impliedly consent thereto.
In September, 1962, the Colorado Supreme Court considered
the jurisdiction of state courts over the Southern Ute Tribe, a corporate entity. In Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 4 the plaintiff sued
the Indian tribe for damages for denying him membership in the
corporate entity and the benefits that flow therefrom. The tribe
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the courts of Colorado
have no jurisdiction over the subject matter; that any attempt by
a state court to determine the rights of membership in an Indian
tribe would be an invasion of the right of sovereignity of the tribethose rights being solely under the control of the tribe. The trial
court sustained the motion. The Colorado court recited that the
tribe had adopted a corporate charter wherein the tribe agreed:
"To sue and be sued in courts of competent jurisdiction within the
United States. . .. "15 It concluded that adopting such provisions
and incorporating under 25 U.S.C. § 476, the tribe had rendered itself amenable to suit in Colorado courts. The court further cited
article II, section 6, of the Constitution of the State of Colorado,
guaranteeing protection of the courts of justice to all persons, and
cited the 14th amendment of the United S'ates Constitution. The
supreme court reversed the trial court's determination and directed
that the motion to dismiss filed in the trial court be denied. The
complexity of the constitutional issue raised by this case affords
interesting speculation as to what the United States Supreme Court
might decide should certiorari be granted.
Jurisdictionover the Person.-The question of jurisdiction over
the person of individuals did not arise in 1962. Usually, there is at
least one case involving the nonresident motorist statute. With a
recently amended nonresident motorist statute, 16 wherein residents
who have absented themselves from the state remain personally
subject to the jurisdiction of the court, it is surprising that the jurisdictional issue did not come before the Colorado Supreme Court
in 1962.
Jurisdiction over the person of corporations was twice consid13 Id. at 759.
14 374 P.2d 691 (Colo. 1962).
15 Id. at 693.
16 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-8-5(ff) (1953).
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ered by the supreme court. The evasiveness of the "person" of a
corporation logically becomes the subject of much dispute. Generally, the Colorado court re-established a well known principle
that in order to subject a corporation to the jurisdiction of a Colorado court, the corporation must be "doing business" in Colorado.
Jurisdiction over the "person" by establishing "doing business"
must be established before service of process is effective. Merely
obtaining proper service of process without first establishing jurisdiction does not subject the corporation to jurisdiction of a Colorado
court.
Bay Aviation Services v. District Court 17 considers a suit wherein the summons and complaint were served on the Secretary of
State, under the Colorado Corporation Act, for damages against a
corporation as a result of an accident in an aircraft temporarily in
Colorado. The trial court held that the provisions of the Colorado
Corporations Act allowing service of process on the Secretary of
S t ate were complied with; that the corporation was not qualified to
do business in Colorado; that at the time of the accident the corporation was in Colorado for one instance; and that normally this
would not be sufficient to constitute "doing business" in Colorado.
Under the circumstances, however, it exercised its sound discretion
and denied the corporation's motion to quash. The Colorado Supreme Court, after review of the facts and the findings of the trial
court, found that the corporation was "not transacting business" or
"doing business" in Colorado, and hence the service of complaint
and summons in an action for death resulting from such accident
could not be made on the Secretary of State as agent for the corporation. Moreover, the court again affirmed that without jurisdiction of the person of the corporation, proper service of process was
ineffective. It should be added that the finding in the Bay Aviation
case establishes that a single transaction in Colorado, to wit: one
demonstration of an airplane, is not sufficient to establish "doing
business" for purposes of jurisdiction. The determination of the
question of the effect of a "single instance" not constituting doing
business has been long overdue and it now appears to be part of our
Colorado law.
A skeleton from the 1956 civil procedure closet again appeared
in the reporters in Bardahl Manufacturing Corp. v. District Court.18
In a prior case by the same name, 19 the supreme court ordered the
trial court to hear motions to dismiss and quash service. After this
order of the supreme court, the District Court of Jefferson County
heard motions to dismiss and to quash service and determined that
the court did not have jurisdiction over the corporation because the
corporation was not "doing business" in Colorado. After this determination, the plaintiff attempted to serve alias summons as a result
of evidence discovered in previous hearings. The corporation again
moved to quash and these subsequent motions were denied. At the
hearing on the motions to quash the second attempted service, the
corporation resisted attempted service on an attorney in open court.
The record was also devoid of new evidence that the corporation
was "doing business" in Colorado. The supreme court held that the
17 370 P.2d 752 (Colo. 1962).
18372 P.2d 447 (Colo. 1962).
19 Barclahl Manufacturing Corp. v. District Court, 134 Colo. 112, 300 P.2d 524 (1956).
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original determination that the corporation was not "doing business" ywas res judicata and that the new attempted service was ineffective for two reasons: there was no new evidence that the corporation was "doing business" after the res judicata determination,
and that service on an attorney in open court is improper unless
the attorney has been specifically authorized to accept service for
his client. It should be added that the supreme court taxed all costs
of the determination to that person attempting to get service, saying that the corporation cannot be required to resist void service of
process. There must be "doing business" by a corporation before
any attempt to serve process, although such process is properly
served, is effective.
Service of Process.-Once jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the persons in a lawsuit is established, service of process must
be properly made. Bay Aviation Services20 and Bardahl"21 clearly
show that service of process problems must follow jurisdictional
problems. Should the jurisdictional hurdles be jumped, the propriety of service of process can be reviewed.
In Bardahl, attempted service of process on an attorney for the
corporation was improper. "The law is well settled that attempted
service on an attorney in open court, or on an attorney who is appearing specially in a state, is improper unless the attorney has been
specifically authorized by his client to accept service. . . . The law
is clear that general employment as an attorney is' 22not sufficient
grounds to serve his client by serving the attorney.
In Martin v. District Court,2 a defendant contended that service of process was improper where the process server placed a copy
of the complaint and summons in an envelope and on the face of the
envelope wrote "Personal. To Isaac Mellman." The envelope was
delivered to Mr. Mellman's secretary and receptionist and the contents of the envelope were not explained to the secretary. The supreme court found that service was properly made on Mr. Mellman
according to Rule 4 (e) (2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, saying:
This rule requires that the copy of the summons and
complaint be "delivered" to the proper person, but clearly
by its own terms does not require that this "delivery" be
accompanied by a reading aloud of the contents so served,
or by explaining what they are, or by verbally advising the
person sought to be served as to what he or she should do
with the papers.21
The court then concluded that service of process was completed by
the method above described.
This holding gives further meaning to Rule 4 (e) (1). The persons therein specified for personal service are, among others, a person's "stenographer, bookkeeper or chief clerk" (at his usual place
of business). Apparently, secretaries and receptionists are now
added to the list by judicial interpretation. Further, delivery of the
process in an envelope, as long as it is personally delivered, would
appear to effect proper service.
20
21
22
23
24

370
372
Id.
375
Id.

P.2d 752 (Colo. 1962).
P.2d 447 (Colo. 1962).
at 449.
P.2d 105 (Colo. 1962).
at 107.
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No cases appeared in the reporters involving service by publication or other methods of service to obtain in rem jurisdiction.
This is another surprise in view of the many cases on these subjects
found each of preceding years.
III.

MOTIONS DIRECTED TO THE COMPLAINT

Some of the problems of motions directed to a complaint have
been covered above. Motions challenging the jurisdiction over the
subject matter and over the person were filed in Triebelhorn, 5 Martinez,2e Bay Aviation Services, -7 Bardahl,"- and Martin."9 The motions in these cases were variously labeled Motion to Dismiss and
Motion to Quash. The Rules of Civil Procedure at Rule 12 (b) provide that the defenses of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and lack of jurisdiction over the person, together with insufficiency of process or service of process, should be filed before further responsive pleading. Then, properly, motions attacking jurisdiction necessarily attack the sufficiency of the complaint. The rules
do not tell us, however, the proper names which these motions
should bear and no consistency of practice has designated those
names. This writer would suggest that motions attacking jurisdiction should properly be labeled Motions to Dismiss on the grounds
alleged. Possibly, the supreme court will clarify this semantic problem for us in 1963.
Motion to Dismiss.-Colorado cases in 1962 showed the variety
of reasons for which a motion to dismiss may be filed under Rule
12 (b). For example, the trial court in Farmers Irrigation Co. v.
Game and Fish Comm'n,: ' granted a motion to dismiss the complaint filed by an adjudicated-owner of water rights against the
State Game and Fish Commission for diversion of waters. The supreme court held that the motion to dismiss was wrongly granted
in that a complaint alleging the diversion by the Commission, which
diversion polluted the water so as to render it unfit for the purposes
to which it had heretofore been applied by the plaintiff, stated a
claim for damage and destruction. Damages for taking property
without just compensation might be awarded if the facts were
established at trial.
The question of what matters may be considered on a motion
to dismiss was raised in Markoff v. Barenberg.' Therein, an assignment for benefit of creditors was made to one Connell. The plaintiff recorded his lien statement but filed no claim of the lien with
the assignee for the benefit of creditors. He did, however, file an
action to foreclose his lien. In the foreclosure suit, the assignee
moved to dismiss contending that it was Markoff's duty to file his
claim with the assignee. The trial court sustained the motion to dismiss. The supreme court held that the complaint, on its face, stated
a good claim for relief. The court continued that the assignee for
benefit of creditors was seeking to avoid the claim under Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 11-1-1 (1953) on the grounds that the lienholder failed to
25 370
26374
27 370
28 372
29 375
30 369
31 368

P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d

757
691
752
447
105
557
964

(Colo.
(Colo.
(Colo.
(Colo.
(Colo.
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file the claim with the assignee and that he therefore lost his rights.
The court stated, however:
The matters raised by the motion to dismiss were in
the nature of avoidance, discharge and waiver, and were
therefore affirmative defenses which under Rule 8, R.C.P.
Colo., cannot be raised by motion but only by answer, the
plaintiff thereafter having the opportunity to raise and try
all issues concerning the force and effect of the particular
assignment, as well as that of the constitutionality of the
statute involved

.... :'-

The court concluded that it was error to dismiss the complaint on
a motion to dismiss.
A motion to dismiss is frequently filed attacking the capacity
of the plaintiff to bring the suit. Rule 17 (a) provides: "Every action
shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest . ..."

Following the spirit of this Rule, Tanner v. City of Boulder 33 involved a motion to dismiss attacking the propriety of parties plaintiff in an action challenging the validity of certain annexation and
zoning ordinances. The trial court dismissed the action on the
ground that the plaintiffs were not "aggrieved persons." The plaintiffs were both residents and taxpayers of the defendant City of
Boulder; and they alleged that they were adversely affected by the
ordinance in dispute. After citing Colo. Rev. Stat. § 139-11-6 (1953),
which grants "aggrieved persons" the right to relief in annexation
proceedings, the court concluded that the plaintiff residents and
taxpayers had a right to be heard under the authority granted by
the statute, saying:
Their complaint made a prima facie showing of a violation of the city charter in the adoption of the questicned
ordinance. As taxpayers and residents asserting that 'hey
had been adversely affected thereby,
they had the ri-ht to
34
challenge the ordinance in question.
A dissenting opinion was filed by Mr. Justice McWilliams, who
concluded that the plaintiffs were not "aggrieved" persons within
the meaning of the statute. The statute applies only to landowners
in the area annexed or sought to be annexed, "and does not include,
as the majority has applied it, to the tens of thousands of residents,
taxpayers and landowners in the City of Boulder."' ,
The district court, in an appeal from the county court on a
claim filed in the decedent's estate, dismissed the appeal on 'he
ground that the administrator was not "a person aggrieved" in
Gushurst v. Benham.3 6 Although this case does not involve the
motion to dismiss as above described, it provides authority which
could be used in arguing a motion to dismiss on real party in interest grounds. It holds that an administrator is a "person aggrieved"
under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-6-10 (1953) for purposes of appeal from
the county court to the district court in estate proceedings where
a claim is allowed in a decedent's estate which is covered by insurance indemnity although the insurance policy is the only asset of
32 Id.
:33 377
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 376

at 965.
P.2d 945 (Colo. 1962).
at 946.
at 948.
P.2d 687 (Colo. 1962).
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the estate. The supreme court held that the allowance of the claim
in the estate for injuries done at the hand of the decedent put the
estate in a worse position than when the estate was opened and,
therefore, the administrator was a "person aggrieved."
Gayton v. Department of Highways3 7 sets forth the basic test
for governing motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Quoting from Dillinger v. North Sterling Irrigation District3 8 the court
recited: "In passing on a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure
to state a claim, the court must consider only those matters stated
within the four corners thereof. '39 After reciting the axiom "that
for the purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss the matters in the
complaint are assumed to be true," the court affirmed the trial
court's action granting the motion to dismiss. This was an action for
damages by a property owner against the Department of Highways
for erecting a bridge at the end of an alley which presumably cut
off one means of access to the plaintiff's property. The court said:
It is obvious that by the erection of this barricade at
the east end of the alley Gayton has not been deprived of
all access to her property, and that despite the barricade
she still has reasonable access to the street system of Pueblo. Such being the case, she necessarily was unable to plead
any special damage and her complaint therefore does not
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.4 0
Motion for More Definite Statement.-In Gayton above, the
defendant could presumably have moved for a more definite statement or bill of particulars under Rule 12 (e). This would be on the
authority of Rule 9 (g), which states: "when items of special damage are claimed, they shall be specifically stated." Instead, a motion
to dismiss was proper in the absence of pleading the special damages required as the court noted.
In Bernstein v. Dun & Bradstreet,41 a motion for more definite
statement was filed to the libel complaint and granted. The more
definite statement which was filed indicated a libel per quod not a
libel per se. In neither the complaint nor more definite statement
were special damages pleaded. After an opportunity for leave to
file an amended complaint, which opportunity was not followed by
37
38
39
40
41

367
135
See
Id.
368

P.2d 899 (Colo. 1962).
Colo. 100, 308 P.2d 608 (1957).
note 37, supra.
at 902-03.
P.2d 780 (Colo. 1962).
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appropriate pleading on the part of the plaintiff, the trial court
granted a motion to dismiss the action. The court then stated:
Since special damages are an essential element of an
action for libel per quod . . . plaintiff was required to specifically plead them. Having failed to do so the trial court
could then have dismissed the plaintiff's complaint under
Rule 12 (b) (5), R.C.P. Colo., for failure to state a claim
42
upon which relief could be granted ....
The supreme court affirmed dismissal for the above reasons.
IV.

CHANGE OF VENUE

Under Rule 98, a motion for change of venue is properly filed
to the complaint before responsive pleading. According to Rule
98(e), failure to file a motion for change of venue, together with
motions under Rule 12 (b), the right to file such motions is waived.
Again, it is surprising that 1962 found no change of venue cases.
V.

INTERVENTION

Under Rule 24 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, certain
persons may apply for permission to intervene in a lawsuit. Because
intervention adds parties to a lawsuit who were not contemplated
by the original parties, the court adopted Rule 24 and has on frequent occasions interpreted its rule. One interpretation is found in
Denver Chap. of the Colorado Motel Ass'n v. City and County of
Denver.43 The motel association, contending that it had the right to
intervene under Rule 24 (a), petitioned to intervene in a suit instituted by the City and County of Denver against Thomas G. Currigan, as auditor of the city. The suit sought to compel the auditor to
sign a contract with an architect for advice and analysis of proposals for a contemplated hotel operation at Stapleton Airfield in
Denver. The intervenors, individual taxpayers and representatives
of a class of taxpayers, contended that they had an absolute right
to intervene in that they would be bound by a judgment in the action and in that they would not be adequately represented by existing parties in the suit, all of which is required by Rule 24(a). The
court again affirmed the requirements of Rule 24(a) for intervention of right, saying:
An application for intervention under Rule 24(a) (2)
must show both that the representation of his interest by
existing parties is or may be inadequate and that the applicant is or may be bound by the judgment in the action, and
neither element, standing alone, is sufficient. If either fac44
tor is missing, there is no absolute right of intervention.
The court found from statements in the intervenor's brief, and from
the other evidence, that the intervenors would be adequately represented in the action. One of the requirements for intervention of
right lacking, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's denial
of intervention. The court added in the last paragraph of its opinion
the following language which goes far in setting forth tests under
Rule 24 (a): "In the absence of such factors as fraud, collusion, bad
42 Id. at 782.

43 374 P.2d 494 (Colo. 1962).
44 Id. at 496.
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faith and the
like, a taxpayer cannot intervene as a matter of abso'45
lute right.
VI. THE ANSWER
After determination of preliminary matters by motion as above
outlined, the question of proper pleading by defendant in his answer should be considered.
As reported above in Markoff v. Barenberg,46 certain matters in
the nature of avoidance, discharge and waiver must be pleaded in
the defendant's answer and are not properly raised by motion. Rules
8 (b) and 8 (c) set forth the details of the defenses. Markoff establishes that failing to file a claim with an assignee for the benefit of
creditors, as required under the statutes, is such a matter of avoidance that must be raised by answer.
One of the affirmative defenses required to be raised by answer47
under Rule 8 (c) is "estoppel." Beery v. American Liberty Ins. Co.
affirms the general principle that the doctrine of estoppel cannot be
invoked against any governmental agency acting in its public capacity.
Rule 8 (c) provides: "Any mitigating circumstances to reduce
the amount of damages shall be affirmatively pleaded," and Rule
13 outlines the procedure for asserting counterclaims and setoffs.
In Transport Clearings of Colorado, Inc. v. Linstedt,4 8 a "counterclaim" was set up in a defendant's answer against the claim of a
collection agency. The collection agency was the assignee of the
person against whom the counterclaim was directed. The agency
contended that the term "counterclaim" was improper and that a
counterclaim could not be asserted against an assignee. The collection agency insisted that the title of the claim set forth in the answer should have been "set off." The court observed: "De minimis
non curat lex. This is an $18.00 tempest over a tea cart. ' 4 9 In dismissing the collection agency's contention, the court recited Rule 8 (c),
which states: "When a party has mistakenly designated a defense
as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on
terms, if justice so required, shall treat the pleadings as if there had
been a proper designation."
In an action on a promissory note, the defendant in Bernklau
v. Stevense0 failed to affirmatively plead "failure of consideration"
by answer. The defendant merely denied the indebtedness, alleged
a tender of an installment payment and counterclaimed for damages as a result of breach of certain covenants. On writ of error, the
defendant urged failure of consideration, which was sustained in
the evidence. The supreme court dismissed this argument, saying:
Defendants, however, must also fail here for they cannot avoid application of the rule that failure of consideration is an affirmative defense which, if not pleaded, is
waived. Colo. R.C.P. Rule 8 (c) and Rule 12 (h). A careful
review of the record in this case indicates that such defense
45
46
47
48
49
50

Id.
368
375
376
Id.
371

at 496.
P.2d 964 (Colo. 1962).
P.2d 93 (Colo. 1962).
P.2d 518 (Colo. 1962).
at 518.
P.2d 765 (Colo. 1962).
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was neither pleaded nor raised at any stage of the trial
court proceeding. 51
Rule 8(c) requires that the defense of "res judicata" shall be
set forth affirmatively in the answer, or other responsive pleading.
Literally, res judicata means "thing decided. ' 52 The defense of res
judicata was raised a number of times before the supreme court in
1962.
In a water rights' priority case, a prior action in which claims
for certain water priorities were waived was res judicata.5 : In a
damage suit for failure to deliver corporate stock, the United States
District Court arbitration award was res judicata on the issue of
the plaintiff's rights to the stock involved.5 4 In the stock case, the
court commented:
The trial court mistakenly took the position that the
United States District Court judgment was not res judicata
of the issue before it because the parties were not identical
since Hudson was not a party to that suit. What the court
overlooked is that the parties need not be identical if their
interests are identical, or if the party to the action is in
privity with
the party later asserting the doctrine of res
55
judicata.
Green v. Chaffee Ditch Co. 56 establishes that successors in interest
to original appropriators of water rights are in privity with those
original appropriators and a decree entered with respect to the original appropriators is res judicata against the successors. A prior
determination of the state of title to real property was res judicata
in an action to quiet title and cancellation of deeds where the same
Burton was a party to both proceedings.5 7 In an estate proceeding,
the judgment entered by the county court, affirmed by the district
court, and to which judgment writ of error was dismissed, was res
judicata on a later attempt to raise the same issues in the county
court by objection to the final report of the administratrix. 5s
VII.

SERVICE OF PLEADINGS DURING COURSE OF CASE

After the court has acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and the persons in any lawsuit, service of pleadings and other
papers is governed by Rule 5 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Service under Rule 5 is less formal than service to obtain jurisdiction
which is prescribed by Rule 4. The Colorado Supreme Court twice
construed the provisions of Rule 5.
In Gould and Preisner,Inc. v. District Court,5 9 Gould and Preisner filed "Answer, Counterclaim and Cross Complaint" but failed
to serve a copy of this pleading upon the other parties to the action.
At the pre-trial conference, Gould and Preisner moved for leave to
serve other defendants with the pleading, supporting the motion by
alleging that the trial had just previously been set, that the omission was a result of mistake, inadvertence and excusable neglect
51 Id. at 770.
52 77 C.J.S., page 274.
53 Alloy v. Stino, 370 P.2d 440 (Colo. 1962).
54 Hudson v. Western Oil Fields, Inc., 374 P.2d 403 (Colo. 1962).
55 Id. at 405,
56 371 P.2d 775 (Colo. 1962).
57 Burton v. Garner, 374 P.2d 707 (Colo. 1962).
58 Clark v. Willis, 368 P.2d 968 (Colo. 1962).
59 369 P.2d 554 (Colo. 1962).
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and that the other parties would not be prejudiced. The trial court
denied Gould and Preisner's motion to serve the pleading. The supreme court reversed the trial court by finding that failure to serve
the pleading was an inadvertent omission of counsel which could be
corrected without prejudice to the rights of any other litigant involved in the action and stated:
To uphold the action of the trial court under the circumstances above set forth would deprive the petitioners
of claimed property rights and might well result in an unjust enrichment of other creditors whose claims may not
be such as to entitle them to preference over the petitioner 0
VIII.

MISCELLANEOUS MOTIONS BEFORE TRIAL

An attorney attempted to withdraw his appearance in Holland
v. Holland.61 The records show that the attorney's client was in
Spain, that the client had no other counsel and that the trial court
would be handicapped in its efforts to make proper orders in the
interests of a minor child. The supreme court found no error in the
trial court's denying leave to withdraw thereby sustaining the discretion of the trial court in acting upon the motion. In this divorce
proceeding, which involved the custody of a minor child, the test
appears to be whether the trial court used its discretion in acting
on the motion for leave to withdraw as attorney of record.
More than three months after counsel had entered his appearance in a negligence case, a motion under Rule 97 to disqualify the
trial judge was filed in Dominic Leone Const. Co. v. District
Court.6 2- The grounds appeared to be the relationship of the judge

with one of the attorneys in the suit. A trial court postponed ruling
on the motion to disqualify, reserving i's ruling until the matter
was at issue. The court cited Rule 97 and paraphrased it as follows:
"Upon filing of the motion to disqualify then 'thereupon all other
proceedings in the case . . . [were] suspended until . . . [the] ruling
. . . [was] made thereon.' ",6 The supreme court ordered that the

trial court suspend all the proceedings other than to rule upon the
motion to disqualify and warned:
From the record now before us it appears that the motion to disqualify the trial judge was filed more than three
months after counsel entered their appearance in the case.
The grounds now claimed for disqualification were then
known to counsel for defendant, nothwithstanding which
they filed motions and initiated proceedings concerned
with the merits of the action. Better practice dictates that a
motion to disqualify
be filed promptly when the grounds
64
are known.

IX.

SEPARATE TRIALS

Only minutes before empaneling a jury, the defendant orally
moved that the plaintiff's two claims be separately tried for the
reason that it would be highly prejudicial to have the two causes
60
61
62
63
64

Id. at 557.
373 P.2d 523 (Colo. 1962).
370 P.2d 759 (Colo. 1962).
Id. at 760.
Ibid.
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of action tried in the same case.6 The motion was denied. Rule
42 (b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "The court in
furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice may order a separate trial of any claim. . . ." In holding that 'here was no error
committed by the trial court in denying the belated and untimely
motion, the supreme court said:
The rule is permissive, not mandatory, and vests in the
trial court considerable discretion as to whether there shall
be a separate trial for each claim of a multiple claim complaint. . . In the instant case, seven months lapsed between the time this case was "at issue" and the time when
it came on for trial. No request for a separate trial was ever
interposed until only moments before the commencement
of the trial proper. Under such circumstances Lamirato's
counsel had the right to assume that there would be a trial
of all issues framed by the complaint and the answers, and
presumably all readied for trial on this premise. 66
X.

PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE

1962 saw greater use of the pre-trial conference which is provided by Rule 16. The separate district courts of the state have enacted local rules of procedure, many of which provide for the use
of pre-trial conferences in every case. It was then reasonable to expect that the supreme court would be called upon to interpret the
enabling provisions of Rule 16 (allowing pre-trial conferences) and
the specific exercises of power by the various district courts under
their local rules of procedure governing pre-trial conferences.
Local Rule 5 of the District Court Rules for the Second Judicial
District (Denver) precipitated an order in the nature of a contempt
citation directed to two Denver attorneys in Pittman v. District
Court. 67 On the time appointed for the pre-trial conference, the attorneys appeared in court without a written pre-trial statement as
required by local Rule 5 (g) (2). The pre-trial conference was continued pending submission of said written statement. At the continued conference, a statement was tendered by one of the attorneys which the court observed did not follow the rule mentioned.
After the continued conference, the court entered a nunc pro tunc
order that the offending attorneys pay $150.00 into the Registry of
the Court. After this order, the principal suit was settled and stipulation was presented to the court waiving any claim to the $150.00
ordered. The court refused to approve the stipulation for dismissal,
contending that the $150.00 ordered was in the nature of a disciplinary action. Attorneys against whom the $150.00 was assessed proceeded by original writ in the nature of mandamus praying that
the trial court be ordered to approve the stipulation for dismissal.
The supreme court observed that local rules of procedure contain
wide departures from former practice and that such rules were
adopted to expedite the transactions of judicial business. The court
stated: "To the extent that the rules of the district court in the several judicial districts are consistent with the Rules of Civil Proce65 Moseley v. Lomirato, 370 P.2d 450 (Colo. 1962).
66 Id. at 455.
67 369 P.2d 85 (Colo. 1962).
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dure adopted by this court, they will be upheld by us.'"'6 The court
commented that in a given case there might be a situation where
the trial court could properly take appropriate action against any
attorney obstructing the progress of the case. The court concluded
that, under the circumstances, "disciplinary action" by the imposition of the $150.00 fine was not a result of a direct contempt and
that "no appropriate proceedings in contempt have been conducted
in this case." The court then directed that the trial court dismiss
the action in accordance with the stipulation of the parties.
Another case involving Rule 5 of the Denver District Court
local rules of procedure caused the supreme court to assume original jurisdiction."' In this case, provisions of the local rule providing that a form of pre-trial order be "approved as to form and content" by the attorneys for the various parties was construed. Counsel for one of the parties refused to sign the pre-trial order approving the content but agreed to sign: "approved as to form only." He
contended that approval as to "form and content" amounts to approval in substance of all things recited in the order. In effect, it
nullifies all objections and exceptions which may have been made
to the rulings of the court at the pre-trial conference. The supreme
court first commented on the rule, saying:
We hold that said local rule of the court is neither contrary to, in conflict with, nor in excess of the limitations or
grants of Rule 16 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, but
rather follows the mandate of and carries out the in'ended
application and effectiveness of said Rules of Civil Procedure, in that said Rule 16 commands that the court "shall
make an order which recites the action taken at the conference ...."70
Secondly, the court stated:
The approval of the "substance" of the order is neither
approval by counsel of the legal effect of the order nor of
the application of substantive law which may appear in
said pre-trial order, but rather, is an approval only 71of a
recital of what transpired at the pre-trial conference.
68 Id. at 90.
69 Albright . District Court, 375 P.2d 685 (Colo. 1962).
70 td. at 687.
71 Ibid.
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Lastly, the court observed that the purpose of the pre-trial conference is to narrow issues and to simplify the conduct of the trial and
does not waive later objections.
By the language of these cases, the supreme court would appear to be approving local rules of procedure in the Denver District
Court. It would also appear, from the language of the court, that
use of a pre-trial conference, and those things specifically provided
for implementation of it, are approved by the Colorado Supreme
Court.
The binding effect of the pre-trial order was forcefully seen in
two Colorado cases. In McNelley v. Smith, 72 the trial court refused
to admit certain photographs in evidence inasmuch as they were
not submitted at the pre-trial conference nor were they furnished
to adverse parties within a reasonable time prior to trial as provided in the pre-trial order. The supreme court approved the trial
court's action in refusing the photographs; the pre-trial order controls the subsequent course of the action. In Robinson v. Crosson,"s
the pre-trial order, which was approved by the parties, determined
that the only issue to be resolved was that relating to the construction of a retaining wall. The court observed:
Since the trial court failed to adjudicate the issue
which the court and the parties, in a pre-trial conference,
agreed was the only one before it, we have before us, in
effect, a record revealing an incomplete disposition of the
case. Piecemeal relief was actually granted here. The whole
controversy should have been resolved unitarily, since
whatever relief could or should have been granted74 in the
case was dependent upon possible offsetting claims.
A new trial was ordered for the trial court to hear the sole issue
presented in the pre-trial conference and reflected by the order.
The pre-trial conference is here to stay. Rule 16 is being continually interpreted. A labyrinth of law is being announced regarding
the pre-trial procedure which is giving meaning, breadth and scope
to pre-trial proceedings. Pre-trial conferences and orders necessarily entered thereafter are proper, binding and enforceable within
the limitation of Rule 16.
XI.

CONTINUANCE

While the granting of a continuance is not the specific subject
of any rule of civil procedure, a continuance is an important question for civil procedure. Schwarz v. Ulmer 75- considers the denial of
defendant's request for a continuance. In this quiet-title suit, defendants requested continuance for purpose of presenting testimony
of one of the defendants, a mining engineer, who was seriously ill
and as a consequence was unavailable as a witness. The supreme
court remanded to the district court for further proceedings, stating:
We find that the action of the trial court in denying
defendants' request for a continuance under the circum72 368
73 368
74 Id.
75 370

P.2d 555 (Colo. 1962).
P.2d 791 (Colo. 1962).
at 792.
P.2d 889 (Colo. 1962).
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stances here presented is arbitrary and an abuse of discretion requiring reversal.
Trial was to the court, and certainly the matter could
have been continued, on the terms if considered proper,
without injury or appreciable inconvenience to anyone, and
to the end that the court might have before it all of the
available facts witn reference to the very matter on which
it held the evidence was insufficient .... 76
XII.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Rule 56 provides that summary judgment may be granted if
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
under Rule 12 (b), may be treated as a motion for summary judgment if matters outside the pleading are presented. Under these
provisions of the rules, two Colorado cases were decided in 1962.
Welp v. Crews77 was a case wherein summary judgment of dismissal was granted upon the pleading, depositions, answer to interrogatories and affidavits. The action was for damages as a result
of loss of a loan commitment. The supreme court upheld the granting of the motion for summary judgment, finding that from depositions, one of which was plaintiff's, there was no loss of the loan
commitment because of any act of the defendants. This crucial issue
being established, the summary judgment was proper. The supreme
court rejected the contention of the plaintiff that summary judgment was premature in that the defendant had not filed an answer.
The court specifically found that Rule 56 does not require that a
defendant plead before he files a motion for summary judgmen t .
Summary judgment for the plaintiff in Walker v. Calada Materials Co. 7 8 was reversed and the cause remanded for trial. Summary judgment in this action on a foreign judgment was granted
upon tender of an exemplified copy of the California judgment
together with the motion for summary judgment. An affidavit in
opposition was filed by the defendant, stating that the alleged judgment attached to the motion for summary judgment was insufficient and denying that he ever authorized one Poppler to appear in
his behalf in the Califonria proceeding. Plaintiffs contended that,
pursuant to Rule 44 (a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. the official
record was presented to the court and hence formed the basis for
the summary judgment. The court observed:
Rule 44(a) R.C.P. Colo. tells how an official record, be
it one kept in or out of Colorado, may be evidenced, but
does not purport to prescribe what must be established in
order to prevail in an action based on a foreign judgment.
Accordingly, the summary judgment entered in favor of
Calada was
improvident and erroneous and it is therefore
79
reversed.
Although the court did not specifically recite, it would appear that
the affidavit in opposition to the summary judgment filed by the
76
77
78
79

Id. at 895.
368 P.2d 426 (Colo. 1962).
375 P.2d 679 (Colo. 1962).
Id. at 681.
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defendant sufficiently made an issue of the California judgment
and hence the mere proof of that judgment according to Rule 44 (a)
was not sufficient to meet the test of Rule 56 that there was no
genuine issue as to any material fact.
XIII.

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

Rule 59 provides that: "A new trial may be granted to all or
any of the parties, and on all or part of the issues, after trial by
jury, court or master." Thereafter follows a list of causes for which
a new trial may be granted. One of those grounds is "newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application
which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and
produced at the trial. '' st Two Colorado cases interpret this ground
for a new trial.
In Hudson v. American Foundry Life Ins. Co. of Denver,;" the
corporation brought an action against the president for effecting
exchange of corporate stock for stock of a second corporation which
became bankrupt. The president argued in his motion for a new
trial that newly discovered evidence had been found. That newly
discovered evidence established acceptance of shares of stock as an
accord and satisfaction of a claim arising out of the exchange. The
journal entries of the corporate books were specifically recited. The
court again announced the well established rule that granting or
denying of a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence rests largely in the counter-discretion of the trial
court. In the absence of abuse of that discretion, it will not be disturbed. The court then determined that the newly discovered evidence was merely corroborative and cumulative. It concluded: "We
also have held that a trial court should deny a motion for a new
trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence when such alleged
evidence
would be only cumulative and would not change the re2
sult."s

A motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence was denied, and the supreme court affirmed the trial court's
order, in Myers v. Myers.s3 After the verdict was rendered, the losing party discovered that one of the witnesses had made statements
contrary to that which he testified in the trial. The court then observed:
No indication of surprise was then expressed by counsel, and no effort made to have the witness modify his testimony. A plaintiff cannot impeach his own witness in such
circumstances, and not having claimed surprise at the time
the testimony was taken, he is in no position to inject a
claim of newly discovered evidence as a means
of overcom4
ing the effect of his witnesses' testimonys
The defendant's choice between additur and a new trial was
5
considered in Herzog v. Murad.s
The verdict was rendered in favor
of the plaintiff in the amount of $500.00; the trial court ordered an
additur in the sum of $6,500.00. In the event that the defendant did
So
81
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not elect to accept this additur, a new trial would have been ordered on the issue of damages alone. Defendants elected the new
trial and the trial court forthwith entered judgment for $7,000.00
in favor of the plaintiff (the verdict of $500.00 plus the $6,500.00
additur). The supreme court reversed the judgment and ordered a
new trial, observing that the trial court did not translate its order
into judgment. The clear terms of the order required a new trial
if the additur was not accepted. Significant in the decision is that
the supreme court did not object to the procedure of offering the
alternative of additur or new trial.
XIV. FINAL JUDGMENT TO WHICH WRIT OF ERROR MAY LIE
It is axiomatic that writ of error will lie only to a final judgment. Rule 111 so specifically states, adding other situations where
writ of error will lie. Additionally, Rule 59(f) states: "The party
claiming error in the trial of any cause must, unless otherwise directed by the trial court, move that court for a new trial, and, without such order, only questions presented in such motion will be considered on review."
In a suit for injunction to prevent a water company from discontinuing water service, the trial court denied the request for injunction and entered judgment for defendant. 6 No motion for new
trial or order dispensing with such motion was filed or entered. The
supreme court dismissed the writ of error to the trial court's order
denying the injunction, saying: "Under the Rules of Civil Procedure a new trial or an order dispensing therewith is a prerequisite
to the right of a party to review in this court. This rule applies in
cases where a review is sought of a pure question of law as well
8s7
as questions of fact.
In a personal injury action,88 defendant's motion to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a claim was granted. There was nothing in the record to indicate that a judgment was entered or a motion for new trial filed or dispensed with. The supreme court dismissed the writ of error without prejudice to pursuing further appropriate proceedings in the trial court. These two 1962 cases follow
a line of Colorado cases which have established that, under Rule
59 (f), a motion for new trial or an order dispensing therewith is
an absolute prerequisite to issuance of writ of error. As the 1962
cases show, it does not seem to matter which of the listed types of
orders in Rule 111 to which writ of error will issue are involved.
The motion for new trial must still be made."9 It might be observed
that the decisions establishing the necessity of a motion for a new
trial have gone beyond the plain words of Rule 59 (f). The rule does
not state that the motion must be made before writ of error will
issue. Rather it only limits the questions to be heard on review. The
words of the rule to the contrary notwithstanding, it appears that
judicial interpretation continues to make a motion for a new trial,
or an order dispensing therewith, an absolute prerequisite to review
of any action of the trial court.
q6
S7
88
89

Helmick v. Consolidated Mutual Water Co., 372 P.2d 160 (Colo. 1962).
Id. at 161.
Carroll v. Fitzsimmons, 371 P.2d 441 (Colo. 1962).
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The motion for new trial has a double-edged importance. In
°
Andrews v. Hayward,1
the trial court granted a new trial. Thereafter, defendants caused a writ of error to be issued. The supreme
court, in dismissing the writ of error, cited an earlier Colorado case
to the effect that there is no final judgment to which writ of error
may lie if the motion for a new trial has been granted. The case
must await retrial before a final judgment exists to which the writ
may lie.
The question of piecemeal review was considered in Hamm v.
Twin Lakes Reservoir and Canal Co." t The supreme court had issued writs of error to two different cases involving the asserted
ownership of ditch easements. The two cases appeared to be inextricably interwoven with the general dispute between the parties. One
of the writs of error was dismissed because no final judgment had
been decreed therein. The plaintiff in error therefore moved to dismiss the present writ of error, without prejudice, and to direct the
trial court to further proceed in the two cases together. The supreme court dismissed the writ, at the plaintiff-in-error's request,
citing Rule 54 (b). This rule allows the trial court to enter final
judgment upon one, or more, but less than all of the claims, on certain conditions, where more than one claim exists. The supreme
court observed that it discouraged piecemeal review of a cause and
expressed an opinion that the two cases involved should be heard
together. It then found that the requirement for piecemeal review
found in Rule 54 (b) (the determination that there is no just reason
for delay) was not met. The writ of error was dismissed, without
prejudice. It is interesting to note that Rule 54 (b) generally applies
to orders of the trial court rather than the issues originally recognized by the supreme court. In the present case, the rule was originally exercised by the supreme court.
XV.

QUESTIONS CONSIDERED BY THE SUPREME COURT

Not every question will be reviewed by the supreme court on
error. A number of Colorado cases decided in 1962 reaffirm this
principle.
In

Shows v. Silverfield Mining and Milling Co.,9 2 various

grounds for reversal were urged in the briefs, which grounds were
not asserted in the motion for new trial. The motion for a new trial
merely stated: "Errors of law were committed in instructing the
jury and in ruling on the inadmissibility of evidence." The court
sta t ed: "Such general assignments of error do not comply with the
mandate of Rule 59 (f) R.C.P. Colo. which provides that only questions presented in the motion for a new trial will be considered on
review. "' 3 Again, the importance of Rule 59 (f) is underlined. In
the Shows case, the true meaning of Rule 59 (f) is mirrored.
In his motion for new trial, the defendant waived the question
of tender of payment in a negotiable instruments case before the
trial.!4 The supreme court held that having waived the issue in the
trial court, the defendant could not reassert it on error.
90
91
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To review a judgment, the supreme court must have a transcript of the record of the proceedings in the trial court before it.
Without the transcript, the supreme court cannot proceed to a determination of the issues. For example, in Bourne v. Rose,95 the reporter's transcript was not lodged in apt time and was not approved
by the trial judge. The supreme court therefore refused to consider
the transcript on error. Likewise, in Burton v. Garner,96 the court
stated: "There being no transcript before us we cannot consider
this ground of asserted error. In its absence we are bound to presume that the findings and conclusions of the trial court are correct
and that the evidence presented supports the judgment. '97 In Jensen v. South Adams County Water Dist.,98 certain statements of defendant's counsel regarding one of the medical witnesses in closing
argument was urged as grounds for a mistrial which have been
granted. The court observed that, in the absence of a transcript of
the argument complained of, the court could not consider the issue.
Finally, in White v. White,"9 in the absence of an offer of proof as
provided under Rule 43 (c), the supreme court could not determine
whether certain testimony was improperly excluded by the trial
court. This decision urged the importance of making the offer of
proof pursuant to Rule 43 (c) in order to perfect a record in the supreme court.
Camenisch v. Nuccitelli'0 0 asserted an axiomatic principle. Writ
of error was dismissed where the plaintiff in error had suffered no
95
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adverse ruling. The court held that the plaintiff in error had no
standing to bring error.
The basic principle of appellate review was asserted in Walker
v. Casto.101 The court stated: "It is presumed that the trial court
correctly applied the law to the facts under consideration, and the
burden is upon the persons who claim error to their prejudice to
show wherein the court erred." -' As a corollary to this, five 1962
cases reaffirm the time-honored principle that the findings of the
trial court on disputed issues of fact will not be disturbed when
supported by competent evidence. 10"
Problems involving the record on error, which are covered by
Rule 112, were raised in Hudson v. American Founders Life Ins. Co.
of Denver.11 4 Rule 112 requires that a party who seeks reversal of
a judgment shall lodge the reporter's transcript with the clerk of
the trial court. Thereafter, objection may be made to the transcript.
In the present case, the reporter in the trial court died before transcribing his notes making it necessary for others to complete the
transcription. The plaintiff in error, who had the burden of lodging
the transcript, argued that the record was "uncertain." Nevertheless, pursuant to Rule 112 (f), the trial judge certified the transcript
which was finally prepared. The plaintiff-in-error produced no evidence or sworn testimony contradicting any portion of the transcript. The supreme court dismissed the objection to the record and
proceeded to determine the matter on the record as certified.
XVI. RELIEF OF JUDGMENT
An often misunderstood remedy under Rule 60 was interpreted
twice by the Colorado Supreme Court in 1962. Rule 60 (b) provides:
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve
a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or
proceeding for the following reasons. . . ." Frequently this rule is
confused with the motion for a new trial provided at Rule 59. Burson v. Burson'0 5 clarified the purpose of Rule 60. In this case, a decree of divorce and order of custody for a minor child was entered
without contest. Nothing was said in the decree regarding alimony.
Nine months after entry of the decree of divorce, the wife filed a
motion to fix alimony payments. The trial court dismissed the wife's
motion, denying her alimony, and the wife sought review by writ
of error. Since the provided time for issuance of writ of error had
expired, the court noted that "(Rule 60 (b)) permits the court to
relieve a party from a final judgment or order for 'mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.' ,1o6 The court then stated,
"Any right to modify the original judgment in light of the allegations contained in the motion would arise from this portion of Rule
60. But such relief must be
sought 'not more than 6 months after
'
judgment.' R.C.P. Colo.60. 117
In another domestic relations case, respondent filed a motion
101 372 P.2d 438 (Colo. 1962).
102 Id. at 440.
103 Watson v. Settlemeyer, 376 P.2d 453 (Colo. 1962); Denton v. Kumpf, 373 P.2d 306
1962); Heckel v. Heckel, 373 P.2d 303 (Colo. 1962); Cline v. Whitten, 372 P.2d 145 (Colo.
People v. Cooke, 370 P.2d 896 (Colo. 1962).
104 377 P.2d 391 (Colo. 1962).
105 369 P.2d 979 (Colo. 1962).
106 Id. at 980.
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under Rule 60 (b) to vacate the trial court's judgment and order
regarding support for a minor child. The motion was filed about
twenty-five months following decree of judgment.10 8 The court,
quoting from an earlier Colorado decision, 10 9 said: "Such motion
[under Rule 60], in any event, is directed to the discretion of the
trial court, and when one files such a motion he admits for all practical purposes that the judgment is in all respects regular on the
face of the record, but asserts that the record would show differently except for mistake,1 1inadvertence, or excusable neglect on behalf of counsel or client." "
Both of the above cases arise under Rule 60 inasmuch as direct
appellate review by writ of error was foreclosed. The three-month
time limitation had run. Properly, a motion under Rule 60 (b) is
the remedy afforded one whose time for direct appellate review has
expired and who can come within the listed provisions of Rule
60 (b).
XVII.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS UNDER RULE

106

That curious and mysterious area of "original proceedings"
again had its test in the Colorado Supreme Court in 1962. Rule 106
abolishes the special forms of pleading and writs of quo warranto,
certiorari and prohibition, among other writs. However, we continue to see reports of these writs being granted both in the supreme court and in the inferior courts. For example, thirteen such
"original proceedings" were reported in 1962. Sometimes, the proceedings are attended with the names of the common law writs; at
other times the proceedings bear the title "in the nature of Writ
of . . ."; and more frequently the proceedings are merely called "original proceedings." Rule 106 (a), by its five subdivisions, describes
relief which could be labeled by common law terminology. Hence,
it is proper that the supreme court grant this relief. And the supreme court did grant such relief in 1962; eight times by prohibition, 1' twice by mandamus, 112 once by certiorari' 1" and once by
quo warranto.' 14 In addition, the supreme court entertained an original proceeding for issuance of prerogative or remedial writ to
require the general assembly to reapportion."- The substance of the
relief granted in each case is fully reported under other subdivisions of this review.
The Colorado Supreme Court in 1962 considered and interpreted the more active rules of civil procedure. The court was consistent with prior rulings in the area of civil procedure and added
another year of decisions to assist in a predictable and orderly administration of just remedies in the courts of record of the state of
Colorado.
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